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Consolidation of MOBAGS: The Quest for Efficiency in Logistics Operations
There is significant potential for the Air Force to save money by consolidating mobility bags (MOBAGS) and, in particular, the standard Chemical or C-Bag. This project will examine whether the Air Force, if it hypothetically stored its C-Bag assets in one location, could gain efficiencies in transportation costs by shipping those bags out to bases when needed by that base's deploying members, or directly to the deployed location, rather than those bases maintaining the bags themselves.
To make a sound judgment, first some background regarding C-Bag composition, the framework for consolidation, and current consolidation practices will be provided.
Then information regarding transportation costs to some representative bases from a proposed consolidation location will be examined to determine if it is more efficient for the Air Force to distribute its C-Bag resources from one consolidated location.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Today the Air Force stores mobility bag assets at over 513 locations, each of which is responsible for the manpower and performance of duties centering around MOBAG management, such as purchasing replenishments for their shelf-life items, as well as providing single-source maintenance, inspection, and accounting for those items.
If those bags could be transported from a single CONUS-based consolidation point to the deploying members' bases on a just-in-time schedule, among many of the benefits realized by consolidation could be a freeing up of heavily tasked Supply personnel at the bases to perform other functions within their units, as well as greater accountability and maintainability of the assets. Because of the significant cost savings that can be achieved through consolidation and centralized distribution, as has been proven in commercial entities, if the CMBCC were utilized as a distribution center for not only the 3 rd and 4 th JSLIST suits, but for the entire C-Bag and its contents, it is possible that the Air Force could achieve considerable cost savings. Therein lays the basis for this research project. for members deploying worldwide. Current Air Force practice is to deploy one of these bags with each deploying member when it is specified in the deployment tasking line remarks. The only exception to this rule is for personnel deploying to the Middle East who will travel through Kuwait, Qatar, or Kyrgyzstan. Those personnel do not have to take a bag with them as they will be issued a C-bag at an Expeditionary Theater Distribution Center (ETDC) which will be discussed later in this paper. be an extraordinary amount of money, when multiplied across the full complement of 300,000+ bags, the sum of $3,000,000 becomes more noteworthy.
HYPOTHESIS & RESEARCH QUESTIONS
FRAMEWORK FOR CONSOLIDATION
There is some question as to whether the number of 300,000 C-Bags is a valid A final note on consolidation at the CMBCC needs to be made regarding numbers of bags. Because at any given time there are upwards of 20,000 Air Force personnel deployed, and the vast majority of those are to the USCENTCOM AOR, which already has consolidated bag distribution (discussed in the next section), there is likely no realistic need for the Air Force to maintain 300,000 bags in the CONUS. In fact, the number could be radically smaller, such as 50,000, for a safety stock of bags in case conflict arises in another part of the world. Again, the determination of the appropriate number is beyond the scope of this project; however it is easy to see that, absent the threat of attacks upon CONUS bases, it makes little sense to maintain so much inventory (with the associated overhead of personnel, warehouse space, replacement costs of shelflife items) at dispersed bases, when so many efficiencies could be achieved by storing them centrally. Arguably many factors play into the calculation of whether or not true efficiencies can be gained through centralization of an asset such as the C-Bags, and that is why this paper focuses on only one factor -the cost of transporting a bag from the CMBCC to where it would be needed for the deploying member.
THE ETDC CONCEPT IN PRACTICE -CONSOLIDATION IN THE AOR
The Air Force is already successfully employing a centralized distribution model for protective equipment in the Middle East. Springing from a concern raised by the USCENTAF/CC, in 2004 the USCENTAF/A4 launched a study of transportation costs deploying to the USCENTCOM AOR every rotation. The study found that in FY04, transportation costs for baggage reached in excess of $51 million. This cost was largely driven by the fact that the MOBAGS (including A-, B-, and C-bags) were considered by the airlines to be excess baggage above and beyond deployers' authorized two personal bags, and, as such, reduced the Allowable Cabin Load for passengers (the amount of passengers that can be carried when factored with aircraft performance parameters including fuel, range, and cargo). The result was a need for more airframes with already costly seats (averaging $1,600 per seat), thus driving up the overall cost of transportation.
Because the preponderance of deploying personnel transited through Qatar, Kyrgyzstan, or Kuwait, ETDCs were established in those countries and personnel deployed to those locations were ordered to leave their bags in place upon redeployment to home station. When the next rotation of personnel deployed through the ETDC bases, they picked up the excess bags in theater rather than carrying them from home station and across the Atlantic Ocean. The resultant cost savings was a staggering $17 million in the first year alone, which included savings from fuel, excess baggage charges, and the intangible benefit of convenience to the Airmen who no longer had to drag 4 or more cumbersome bags through airports.
If the ETDC concept can work so effectively in the theater of operations, there is no reason to believe that the centralized storage and distribution concept cannot also work well within the CONUS. However, before a decision of that magnitude can be made, much data and cost analysis must be completed, as well as a risk-reward evaluation. This paper attempts to provide Air Force leadership with one piece of the decision matrix -the transportation costs associated with moving bags from a consolidated location, the CMBCC, to either a deploying member's home station for onward movement as checked baggage, or directly to the deployed location. became a meaningful and realistic number that could be researched. Finally, there are times when half or all of a unit will deploy at one time; thus the cost of moving 50 bags as a notional unit move was examined.
ASSUMPTIONS/LIMITATIONS
In order to keep the scope of this project narrow, a number of assumptions were made. The first assumption made was that each base will retain a number of chemical suit ensembles that can be used to size assigned personnel, and that the sizing data will be able to be sent to the CMBCC for bag construction in a just-in-time manner based upon a list of deploying members. The second assumption made was that there will be adequate deployment notification time before the Required Delivery Date (RDD) or date that the person is required to be in place for the tasking, such that on-hand-assets from the base are not required to be sent with the deploying member.
Some of the limitations which this project does not address includes obstacles to implementation and issues beyond the scope of the project. One of the biggest obstacles to implementation of a centralized stocking concept would likely be obtaining the squadron commanders' confidence in the CMBCC's ability to equip their Airmen with correctly sized equipment and to have those bags delivered within an adequate amount of time before deployment or meet their Airmen in a timely manner at the deployed location. Another factor that will not be addressed is the reality that there will always need to be a "safety stock" of MOBAGs maintained at each base to support the rapid deployment of "first responder" personnel, such as Contingency Response Wing members, who must be ready to deploy within windows as short as 12 hours from notification. An issue which is beyond the scope of this project but is worthy of exploration is to determine the actual requirement for MOBAGS -how many are needed of each type based upon OPLAN and contingency support requirements.
This project does not attempt to answer any of these concerns; however the answers to those issues could have significant impact on a real-world implementation of MOBAG consolidation strategies.
Part IV RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The data for this study was relatively easy to obtain and examine. First, Mr.
Barry Evans from the 20th Logistics Readiness Squadron, Shaw AFB, South Carolina provided the cost data for the shipments, given the weights and destinations. That data was then manipulated within an Excel spreadsheet and formatted such that it was easy to understand visually. Next, excess baggage costs charged by America's "Big Five" airlines to military personnel, which can be found below in Airlines with 4 pieces of baggage would be charged $200, since the "free" allowance is for 2 bags, with each additional bag costing $100.
Along with the shipment data, the excess baggage costs were also factored into the spreadsheets which can be found in Appendices A through C. The amounts provided in Appendices B and C, were obtained by dividing the "Total Shipment Cost" (Appendix A) by either the number of bags to arrive at "Cost per Pound" (Appendix B) or by the pounds shipped to arrive at "Cost per Bag" (Appendix C).
For the purposes of this analysis, a hypothetical but realistic example of an
Airman deploying with 4 pieces of baggage (2 personal bags, 1 unit-specific A-bag, and 1 C-bag) will be considered. From Table 1 , one can see that a fourth piece of excess baggage will almost always equal a $200 charge (with the exception of Continental, but since it is the one-off example, the more expensive charge will be the baseline). Thus, no matter where in the world an Airman is deploying to, the cost to check the fourth bag on his commercial flight will be $200 total, regardless of destination. 
Table 4 -Shipment Costs from Lackland AFB
In each and every case studied, shipping the bags from home station with the deploying Airman was less expensive than shipping bags from CMBCC to the home base or from CMBCC directly to the deployed location. The next factor to examine was which mode of shipment was more efficient. Despite being sent to locations around the globe, the longest transit time for a bag to move through the system was quoted at 10 days. Air shipments within the CONUS were considered "next-day" deliveries. Surface shipments had very respectable delivery times, with the longest being 4 days from the CMBCC to Travis AFB. Within the cost analysis regarding mode of shipment for CMBCC bag origination, the consistent "winner" was surface. The surface costs beat the air costs every time.
The interesting outcome of the study is that the decision to originate a bag from the CMBCC and then send it to either the home station or directly to the deployed location depends solely on the destination of the bag. Sometimes it was cheaper to send it to the home station for onward movement with the Airman as excess baggage, and sometimes it was less expensive to send the bag directly from the CMBCC to the deployed location. There did not appear to be a connection between regions; nor was there a noticeable break point at which shipping larger quantities of bags would result in lower costs. Again, the only definitive results were that sending C-bags from home station as excess baggage was least expensive in every case, and the surface mode of shipment from CMBCC, no matter the destination, was cheapest in every case.
Part V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section addresses the overarching research question posed by the study, provides a summary of research conclusions, and recommends future research considerations for exploration.
OVERARCHING RESEARCH QUESTION
The overarching research objective of this study was to examine the hypothesis that: With regard to transportation costs, it is more efficient to store/maintain/issue C-Bags at/from the CMBCC and transport them to bases or directly to deployed locations when needed than it is to store/maintain/issue those bags at/from the home bases themselves.
In order to evaluate this hypothesis, the following specific research questions were evaluated:
1. Given the data, which appears to be the least expensive method to deploy C-bags? From a home base? Or from the CMBCC?
A thorough examination of the data reveals that the least expensive method to deploy C-bags is from the home base. Even when traveling as excess baggage, there was never a time when it was cheaper to ship from the CMBCC than to issue bags from home station.
Which is the most efficient mode of shipment for C-bags, air or surface?
The most efficient mode of shipment is by surface. In all cases, bags could be shipped from the CMBCC and be delivered to the destination, whether that was at a CONUS base for onward movement as excess baggage, or directly to the overseas destination, within 2 to 10 days for a much greater cost savings than shipping the same bags by air.
3. Are there efficiencies to be gained through economies of scale when shipping directly from a centralized location?
While in the commercial sector this is a common justification to centralization, in this study there were no immediately apparent economies of scale to be achieved. The most expensive method was to ship one bag at a time. Beyond that, the size of the shipment did not have a recognizable impact on price differentiation. Perhaps this was because all of the lots were significantly less than truckload size, with the largest shipment weighing only 1,500 pounds.
SUMMARY: RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The data in this study is clear; with regard to transportation costs alone, it is more efficient to distribute and deploy C-bags from home stations with deployers than it is to ship them from the CMBCC. The danger, however, is in taking such a small portion of the picture and making a sweeping judgment about CMBCC efficiency or lack thereof. Indeed, there are many other factors which should weigh into the overall decision making process about whether or not to centralize MOBAG distribution at the CMBCC. Very real and sometimes intangible issues such as manning, shelf-life item replenishment, and readiness and responsiveness should also be taken into consideration.
Furthermore, transportation costs are dependent upon a number of factors. Rising fuel costs would result in a price increase across the board, whichever mode of travel has been decided upon. However, airline pricing for excess baggage is much more subject to fluctuation. It only takes one airline to begin discretionary pricing tactics, and before long the rest follow suit. This could have a significant impact on the outcome of this study if it were to be repeated at a later time.
FUTURE RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of other questions related to MOBAGs and consolidation efforts that warrant further examination. Here are some suggestions for further research projects:
-Determine the "right" number of MOBAGs needed to support the tasked warfighters.
In the past, this determination was made by simply examining the maximum number of personnel that could be tasked from one base to support any number of off-the-shelf OPLANs and applying a formula which was dependent upon the scenario. In the Cost per bag to move from the CMBCC to location via specified mode
